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[4910-13-P]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2026-4664; Project Identifier MCAI-2025-01644-R; Amendment 39-23517; AD 2026-22-15]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2025-13-09, which applied to all Airbus Helicopters Model AS-365N2, AS 365 N3, EC 155B, EC155B1, SA-365N, and SA-365N1 helicopters. AD 2025-13-09 required inspecting the tightening torque, reporting the results of the inspections, and, depending on the results of the inspection, taking corrective action. Since the FAA issued AD 2025-13-09, the manufacturer determined that additional inspections of the main rotor (MR) servo-controls nut torque are required. This AD retains some of the actions of AD 2025-13-09 and requires additional inspections and, depending on the results of the inspection, corrective actions. This AD also requires reporting certain information to the manufacturer. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective [INSERT DATE 35 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER].

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of [INSERT DATE 35 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER].

ADDRESSES:

AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2026-4664; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, the mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI), any comments received, and other information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

Material Incorporated by Reference:

• For European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) material identified in this AD, contact EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; phone: +49 221 8999 000; email: ADs@easa.europa.eu; website: easa.europa.eu. You may find the EASA material on the EASA website at ad.easa.europa.eu.

• You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 10101 Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110. It is also available at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2026-4664.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Aryanna Sanchez, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; phone: (520) 990-9321; email: aryanna.T.Sanchez@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to supersede AD 2025-13-09, Amendment 39-23075 (90 FR 30581, July 10, 2025) (AD 2025-13-09). AD 2025-13-09 applied to all Airbus Helicopters Model AS-365N2, AS 365 N3, EC 155B, EC155B1, SA-365N, and SA-365N1 helicopters. The FAA issued

AD 2025-13-09 to correct an unsafe condition identified as loss of tightening torque between the upper ball bearing end and the MR servo-control.

The NPRM was published in the *Federal Register* on July 2, 2026 (91 FR 40487). The NPRM was prompted by an MCAI, issued by EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union. EASA issued EASA AD 2025-0239, dated October 27, 2025 (EASA AD 2025-0239) (also referred to as the MCAI). The MCAI states that further investigations identified paint on the lock-washer as the root cause of the loss of tightening torque, and that the manufacturer determined additional inspections of the MR servo-controls nut torque were necessary.

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require a one-time inspection of the torque on each nut connecting the upper ball bearing end to all three MR servo-controls, report the inspection results (including no findings) and, depending on the results of this inspection, take corrective actions.

You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2026-4664.

Discussion of Final Airworthiness Directive

Comments

The FAA received one comment from an anonymous commenter. The following presents the comment received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to the comment.

Request for Clarification of the Determination for the Inspection

An anonymous commenter requested that the FAA clarify the determination for the inspection interval. The commenter asked what analysis demonstrates that the 110-hour inspection interval guarantees that dynamic paint compression and fretting on the lock-washer will not cause total torque loss under heavy operational loads. The commenter further requested clarification on what type of non-destructive testing, such as fluorescent penetrant inspection or eddy current inspection is mandated in order to

inspect for stresses when a nut is discovered loose or below the minimum torque allowance.

The FAA agrees to clarify. This AD addresses a loss of tightening torque. The 110-hour inspection interval was established to determine whether the unsafe condition is present on the helicopter. The inspection intervals are based on numerous factors to include but not limited to, normal inspection times for the parts allotted, flight hours, and regular maintenance compliance times. Additionally, non-destructive testing protocols are used to inspect the main rotor servo-controls. Accordingly, this AD requires a visual inspection in accordance with the referenced material to detect any discrepancies. It was determined that this visual inspection was sufficient to detect any discrepancies. The FAA did not change this AD as a result of this comment.

Request for the FAA to Require Replacement of Affected Part

The commenter requested the FAA clarify why a design change under 14 CFR 21.99 has not been required to permanently eliminate the unsafe condition.

The FAA agrees to clarify. Under 14 CFR 21.99, a design change is required when the FAA finds the design change necessary to correct the unsafe condition of the product. The FAA determined that the inspections and corrective actions required by this AD are sufficient to correct the unsafe condition, and therefore a design change is not necessary. The FAA did not change this AD as a result of this comment.

Conclusion

These products have been approved by the civil aviation authority of another country and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to the FAA's bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, that authority has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI referenced above. The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered any comments received, and determined that air safety requires adopting this AD as proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD to

address the unsafe condition on these products. Except for minor editorial changes, including adding an exception to the effective date for June 20, 2024 [the effective date of EASA AD 2024-0110], this AD is adopted as proposed in the NPRM. None of the changes will increase the economic burden on any operator.

Material Incorporated by Reference Under 1 CFR Part 51

The FAA reviewed EASA AD 2025-0239, which specifies procedures for a one-time check (inspection) of the torque on each nut connecting the upper ball bearing end to all three MR servo-controls and, depending on the results, corrective actions, which include performing additional torque inspections, replacing the lock-washer, applying torque, lockwire, and sealing compound to the upper ball bearing end of the MR servo-control, inspecting the ball bearing end of the MR servo-control, replacing a ball bearing end, inspecting the upper end fitting of the MR servo-control, and replacing the MR servo-control. EASA AD 2025-0239 also requires reporting the inspection results (including no findings) to AH [Airbus Helicopters].

This material is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Differences Between this AD and the MCAI

Where the material referenced in the MCAI specifies contacting Airbus Helicopters for certain actions, this AD requires accomplishing actions in accordance with a method approved by the FAA, EASA, or Airbus Helicopters' EASA Design Organization Approval.

Interim Action

The FAA considers that this AD is an interim action. If final action is later identified, the FAA might consider further rulemaking then.

Costs of Compliance

The FAA estimates that this AD affects 63 helicopters of U.S. registry.

The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

Estimated costs

Action	Labor Cost	Parts Cost	Cost per product	Cost on U.S. operators
Inspecting the tightening torque	1 work-hour x $85 per hour x 3 (three MR servo-controls per helicopter) = $255	$0	$255	$16,065
Reporting	1 work-hour x $85 per hour = $85	$0	$85	$5,355

The FAA estimates the following costs to do any replacements or repairs that will be required based on the results of the inspection. The agency has no way of determining the number of helicopters that might need these replacements or repairs:

On-condition costs

Action	Labor Cost	Parts Cost	Cost per product
Inspect the condition of the threads of one main servo-control	1 work-hour x $85 per hour = $85	$0	$85
Replace ball bearing end	1 work-hour x $85 per hour = $85	$1,299	$1,384
Replace main rotor servo-control (three MR servo-controls per helicopter)	1 work-hour x $85 per hour = $85 (per MR servo-control)	$41,039 (one MR servo-control)	Up to $123,372 (three MR servo-controls per helicopter)
Re-inspect the nut tightening torque of the upper ball bearing end	1 work-hour x $85 per hour = $85	$0	$85

The extent of the corrective actions that may be needed as a result of any discrepancies detected, after the third inspection, could vary significantly from helicopter

to helicopter. The FAA has no way of determining the cost to correct or repair each helicopter or the number of helicopters that may require repair.

Paperwork Reduction Act

A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a currently valid OMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2120-0056. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated to be approximately 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, Federal Aviation Administration, 10101 Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177-1524.

Authority for this Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority

because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

The FAA has determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866,

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and

(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

The Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39 - AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by:

a. Removing Airworthiness Directive 2025-13-09, Amendment 39-23075 (90 FR 30581, July 10, 2025); and

b. Adding the following new airworthiness directive:

2026-22-15 Airbus Helicopters: Amendment 39-23517; Docket No. FAA-2026-4664;

Project Identifier MCAI-2025-01644-R.

(a) Effective Date

This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective [INSERT DATE 35 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER].

(b) Affected ADs

This AD replaces AD 2025-13-09, Amendment 39-23075 (90 FR 30581, July 10, 2025).

(c) Applicability

This AD applies to all Airbus Helicopters Model AS 365 N2, AS 365 N3, EC 155 B, EC 155 B1, SA 365 N, and SA 365 N1 helicopters, certificated in any category.

(d) Subject

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 6710, Main rotor control.

(e) Unsafe Condition

This AD was prompted by reports of two occurrences of the loss of tightening torque between the upper ball bearing end and the main rotor (MR) servo-control. The FAA is issuing this AD to detect loss of tightening torque. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in disconnection between the upper ball bearing end and the MR servo-control and consequent loss of control of the helicopter.

(f) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

(g) Required Actions

Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this AD: Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified in, and in accordance with, European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2025-0239, dated October 27, 2025 (EASA AD 2025-0239).

(h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2025-0239

(1) Where EASA AD 2025-0239 refers to its effective date or June 20, 2024 [the

effective date of EASA AD 2024-0110], this AD requires using the effective date of this AD.

(2) Where EASA AD 2025-0239 requires compliance in terms of flight hours, this AD requires using hours time-in-service.

(3) Where EASA AD 2025-0239 defines "the ASB", this AD requires replacing that definition with "Airbus Helicopters Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) AS365-67-30-0001 Issue 003, dated May 21, 2025 (ASB AS365-67-30-0001 Issue 003), or ASB EC155-67-30-0001 Issue 004, dated June 18, 2025 (ASB EC155-67-30-0001 Issue 004), as applicable for the model helicopter. For compliance with this AD, Model SA 365 N and SA 365 N1 helicopters are to use ASB AS365-67-30-0001 Issue 003 and Model EC 155 B, EC 155 B1 are to use ASB EC155-67-30-0001 Issue 004".

(4) Where paragraphs (1) and (2) of EASA AD 2025-0239 and the material referenced in EASA AD 2025-0239 specify "check", this AD requires replacing that text with "inspect" or "inspection" as applicable.

(5) Where the material referenced in EASA AD 2025-0239 specifies discarding parts, this AD requires removing those parts from service.

(6) Where the material referenced in EASA AD 2025-0239 specifies hard point, for this AD a hard point may be indicated by resistance, ratcheting, blocking, or difficulty when turning the ball bearing end into the upper end fitting of the MR servo-control by hand.

(7) Where paragraph (9) of EASA AD 2025-0239 specifies reporting inspection results (including no findings) to AH [Airbus Helicopters] within 7 days after the inspection required by paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of EASA AD 2025-0239, this AD requires reporting that information at the applicable time in paragraph (h)(7)(i) or (ii) of this AD.

(i) If the inspection was done on or after the effective date of this AD: Submit the

report within 30 days after the inspection required by paragraph (1), (2), and (3) of EASA AD 2025-0239.

(ii) If the inspection was done before the effective date of this AD: Submit the report within 30 days after the effective date of this AD.

(8) Where paragraph (7) of EASA AD 2025-0239 specifies contacting AH [Airbus Helicopters] for applicable repair instructions if a discrepancy is detected after the third inspection, and where the material referenced in EASA AD 2025-0239 specifies to contact Airbus Helicopters for repair instructions, this AD requires, before further flight, accomplishing these corrective actions in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus Helicopters' EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized signature.

(9) This AD does not adopt the "Remarks" section of EASA AD 2025-0239.

(i) Special Flight Permits

Special flight permits, as described in 14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199, are not allowed.

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the International Validation Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (k) of this AD and email to AMOC@faa.gov.

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards

district office/certificate holding district office.

(k) Additional Information

For more information about this AD, contact Aryanna Sanchez, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; phone: (520) 990-9321; email: aryanna.t.sanchez@faa.gov.

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of the material listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this material as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2025-0239, dated October 27, 2025.

(ii) [Reserved]

(3) For EASA material identified in this AD, contact EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; phone: +49 221 8999 000; email: ADs@easa.europa.eu; website: easa.europa.eu. You may find this EASA AD on the EASA website at ad.easa.europa.eu.

(4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 10101 Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110.

(5) You may view this material at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations or email

fr.inspection@nara.gov.

Issued on November 2, 2026.

Steven W. Thompson,
Acting Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division,
Aircraft Certification Service.
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